RazorNews Opinion
The decision by the Nigeria Police Force to devote the 2026 Conference and Retreat for Senior Police Officers, CARSPO 2026, to the development of a roadmap for the effective management of security during elections could hardly have come at a more consequential moment. With the 2027 general elections already looming on the national horizon, the choice of theme — “Developing a Nigeria Police Roadmap for Effective Management of Security During Elections” — is both timely and necessary. But the real test will not be the quality of speeches delivered at the Landmark Event Centre in Owerri, Imo State, from September 21 to 23. It will be whether the conference produces an actionable framework capable of changing the way elections are secured across Nigeria.
The presence of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Inspector-General of Police Olatunji Rilwan Disu and Imo State Governor Hope Uzodimma underscores the importance attached to the gathering. Yet the significance of CARSPO 2026 must not be reduced to the stature of the dignitaries expected to attend. Conferences do not secure elections. Retreats do not prevent electoral violence. Roadmaps do not become useful simply because they are unveiled at impressive ceremonies. What Nigeria needs is a security architecture that works before, during and after elections, and a police institution sufficiently professional, impartial and accountable to implement it.
The involvement of Lenders Consulting as a partner in the conference is also worthy of modest commendation. At a time when the challenges of securing Nigeria’s democratic process increasingly require collaboration beyond the traditional boundaries of government, responsible private-sector participation in initiatives that strengthen public institutions deserves recognition. Such partnerships, however, are most valuable when they contribute meaningfully to capacity-building and national development rather than merely adding ceremonial gloss to public events. In this instance, the opportunity should be used to reinforce the broader principle that safeguarding democracy is a shared national responsibility.
For decades, election security has remained one of the most sensitive responsibilities of the Nigeria Police Force. This is understandable. Elections are inherently competitive, and political competition in Nigeria can become dangerously intense when contestants view political office as a pathway to economic power, influence and access to state resources. In such an environment, the police occupy an unenviable position. They are expected to protect voters, candidates, electoral officials, observers, journalists and electoral materials while simultaneously maintaining public order and enforcing the law.
The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the police themselves are often accused by competing political interests of bias. One party may perceive the deployment of security personnel as favouring its opponents, while another may complain that the police have failed to act against its rivals. These perceptions can become as damaging as actual misconduct because public confidence is indispensable to peaceful elections.
CARSPO 2026 should therefore confront the central question that has repeatedly bedevilled election security in Nigeria: how can the police guarantee security without becoming an instrument of political manipulation?
The answer begins with institutional neutrality.The Nigeria Police Force cannot secure credible elections if its personnel are perceived as serving the interests of the party in power or any individual political actor. Its constitutional and statutory responsibilities are to the Nigerian state and its citizens, not to political parties. Every officer deployed for election duty must understand that his or her allegiance is to the law.
This principle must be translated into operational instructions, not left as a matter of rhetoric.The proposed roadmap should clearly establish the rules of engagement for election deployment. Officers must know what they can and cannot do, when force may be used, how complaints should be handled, how arrests are to be made and how allegations of electoral offences are to be documented. There should be no ambiguity that permits individual officers to improvise in circumstances where neutrality and restraint are essential.
Equally important is the issue of deployment. Nigeria has previously witnessed elections in which security personnel were accused of excessive presence in certain areas and inadequate presence in others. A successful election security strategy cannot simply mean deploying large numbers of policemen. It means deploying the right number of properly trained personnel to identified risk areas based on credible intelligence.
The police must consequently strengthen intelligence-led election security. Threat assessments should be conducted well ahead of polling day, with particular attention to flashpoints, communal tensions, cult activities, political violence, hate speech, arms proliferation and the activities of known criminal networks. The police should work closely with the Independent National Electoral Commission, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the military where necessary, intelligence agencies and other relevant stakeholders.
However, inter-agency cooperation must not become an excuse for unclear command structures. Election security requires coordination, but coordination is effective only when responsibilities are clearly defined. The police should know who is responsible for what, who has operational command and how decisions will be communicated. Security agencies cannot afford situations in which conflicting instructions are issued in the middle of a crisis.
The roadmap should also address the safety of electoral officials and materials. Election workers are often among the most vulnerable participants in the electoral process. They may be exposed to threats before polling, intimidation at polling units and attacks during the movement of sensitive materials. If electoral officials are unable to perform their duties without fear, the integrity of the election is compromised before a single ballot is counted.
The same applies to voters. A police presence at polling centres should reassure voters, not intimidate them. Officers should be trained to distinguish between peaceful political activity and genuine threats to public order. The objective should be to create an environment in which citizens can vote freely and return home safely.
There is also a compelling need to protect journalists and accredited observers. Elections cannot be properly scrutinised if reporters are assaulted, detained or prevented from accessing legitimate areas of coverage. The media is an important component of democratic accountability, and security personnel must understand the distinction between legitimate journalism and activities that constitute a genuine security threat.
Perhaps most importantly, CARSPO 2026 should address the problem of accountability. Election security cannot be credible if misconduct by security personnel is investigated internally and then quietly forgotten. Officers who abuse voters, assault journalists, interfere with voting, aid political thuggery or unlawfully obstruct electoral officials must be held accountable. The same principle should apply to officers who refuse to perform their duties because of political pressure.
Accountability is not an attack on the police. It is a means of strengthening the institution. The Inspector-General of Police, Olatunji Rilwan Disu, therefore has an opportunity at CARSPO 2026 to place professional policing at the centre of the Force’s electoral strategy. The conference should produce measurable commitments rather than another collection of policy statements.
For example, the Nigeria Police Force should consider establishing a comprehensive pre-election security assessment mechanism, publishing clear operational guidelines for election duties, strengthening specialised training for personnel deployed to polling locations and establishing credible channels through which citizens can report misconduct by officers.
Technology should also occupy an important place in the proposed roadmap. Modern policing cannot rely exclusively on physical deployment. Intelligence databases, secure communication systems, incident reporting platforms, geographic risk mapping and real-time coordination can improve the police response to election-related threats.
But technology cannot substitute for integrity. A sophisticated communications system in the hands of compromised personnel will not produce credible elections. What Nigeria needs is a combination of technology, training, discipline and professionalism.
The political class must equally bear responsibility. It is convenient for politicians to demand neutrality from security agencies when they are in opposition and then seek favourable treatment when they hold power. That culture must end. Political parties and candidates must be made to understand that security personnel are not instruments for settling political scores.
The police cannot independently guarantee peaceful elections if politicians continue to recruit thugs, finance violent groups, distribute weapons or incite supporters against opponents.
CARSPO 2026 should therefore not become a police-only conversation. Political parties, civil society organisations, election management institutions, traditional and religious leaders, the media and other stakeholders should have a place in the broader national conversation on election security.
The role of state governments also deserves attention. The fact that Governor Hope Uzodimma is hosting the conference in Imo State provides an opportunity to underscore the importance of state-level cooperation in election security. While policing remains a federal responsibility, the security realities of Nigerian states differ considerably. What works in one part of the country may not necessarily work in another.
Election security planning must therefore be nationally coordinated but locally informed. The choice of Imo State is also significant because the South-East, like other parts of Nigeria, has experienced security challenges that can complicate electoral participation. The police must demonstrate that its security strategy is capable of protecting voters regardless of region, ethnicity, political affiliation or social status.
There should be no safe election for one part of Nigeria and dangerous elections for another. The ultimate measure of electoral security is not the number of arrests made or the number of security personnel deployed. It is whether citizens can participate in the democratic process without fear.
A peaceful election is not necessarily a credible election. An election may be peaceful because voters are intimidated into staying away. Conversely, an election may experience isolated incidents of disorder while still meeting the broader requirements of a credible democratic exercise. The police must therefore understand that its responsibility is not merely to suppress disturbances but to create conditions in which lawful democratic participation can flourish.
This distinction should be central to the roadmap emerging from Owerri. The police must also guard against the temptation to define success by statistics alone. A large number of arrests may look impressive in a post-election briefing, but arrests are not the same as justice. What matters is whether those responsible for electoral violence are properly investigated and prosecuted and whether innocent citizens are protected from arbitrary detention.
The judiciary and prosecutors must therefore be part of the conversation. Election-related offences require timely investigation and prosecution if deterrence is to become meaningful. When perpetrators believe that they can unleash violence and escape consequences, no amount of police deployment will permanently solve the problem.
The Federal Government should also provide the Nigeria Police Force with the resources necessary to perform its election duties. It is unreasonable to demand world-class election security from officers who lack adequate logistics, communications equipment, transportation, training and welfare support. Police personnel deployed for elections face enormous pressure, and their professionalism is easier to sustain when the institution itself demonstrates that it values their welfare and operational readiness.
But funding must come with accountability. Additional resources for election security should be transparently managed, and procurement and deployment must be subject to appropriate oversight. The public deserves to know that money appropriated to protect democracy is actually being used for that purpose.
CARSPO 2026 should therefore be judged by what happens after the conference. Will the roadmap be published? Will its recommendations be implemented? Will officers receive specialised training before the 2027 elections? Will threat assessments be regularly updated? Will political violence be confronted regardless of the identity of the perpetrators? Will complaints against police personnel be independently and transparently handled? Will voters see the police as protectors rather than as instruments of intimidation?
These are the questions that matter. President Tinubu’s expected participation should also be viewed within this broader context. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has a responsibility to ensure that security institutions remain professional and constitutionally focused. His administration’s commitment to democratic governance will be judged not only by electoral reforms but also by whether Nigerians can exercise their franchise without fear.
The Inspector-General, for his part, must ensure that the conference becomes a turning point in the Force’s approach to election security. The Nigeria Police Force cannot afford another election cycle dominated by accusations of partisanship, arbitrary arrests, excessive force or inadequate protection.
Nigeria’s democracy is now too mature to treat election security as an improvised operation activated shortly before polling day. Election security must begin long before campaigns peak. It must continue after results are declared. It must include early warning, prevention, mediation, protection, investigation and accountability. That is why the theme of CARSPO 2026 is so important.
A roadmap is useful only if it leads somewhere. The police must leave Owerri with a practical, measurable and enforceable plan for protecting the ballot, the voter and the democratic process. The conference should produce clear responsibilities, timelines and accountability mechanisms. It should identify weaknesses honestly rather than celebrate institutional achievements. It should invite difficult questions and provide credible answers.
Above all, it should recognise that the police are not the owners of Nigeria’s democracy. They are its protectors.
The ballot belongs to the citizen. The mandate belongs to the voter. The duty of the police is to ensure that neither is stolen through intimidation, violence or unlawful interference.
If CARSPO 2026 succeeds in embedding that philosophy into the operational culture of the Nigeria Police Force, the Owerri retreat will have achieved something of lasting value. If it ends merely with speeches, photographs, communiqués and ceremonial declarations, Nigeria will have lost another opportunity.
The country does not need another promise of peaceful elections. It needs a security architecture capable of delivering one.
The countdown to 2027 has already begun. The police must begin now.
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