Nigeria’s proposed deeper defence-industrial collaboration with Türkiye should not be another addition to the country’s long catalogue of international military agreements that produce impressive ceremonies, sophisticated equipment and little enduring industrial capacity.
The time has come for Nigeria to ask a more fundamental question: Are we building a defence industry, or merely building a bigger market for foreign defence manufacturers?
For more than six decades, Nigeria has entered into defence cooperation arrangements with countries including Israel, China, the United States and Türkiye. These relationships have provided military equipment, training and technical assistance. But despite the billions spent on defence procurement, Nigeria remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for critical military hardware, components, maintenance and technology.
That dependence should concern every serious policymaker.
Nigeria cannot achieve genuine national security while critical aspects of its defence capability remain vulnerable to foreign supply chains.
We therefore welcome collaboration with Türkiye, but with an important caveat: Nigeria must negotiate partnerships from the standpoint of national interest, not procurement convenience.
The first requirement is knowledge.
Nigeria must know exactly what its Armed Forces need. How much ammunition, uniforms, vehicles, components, communication equipment and other consumables are required annually? What equipment is reaching the end of its operational life? What needs regular replacement? What can be repaired locally? What can Nigerian companies manufacture today? And where are the technological gaps that genuinely require foreign intervention?
These are not academic questions. They should form the foundation of every major defence procurement decision.
Unfortunately, Nigeria has often approached defence procurement from the opposite direction. Equipment becomes available from a foreign supplier, and the country begins to consider how to acquire it, rather than first determining whether the equipment fits into a coherent national capability-development plan.
That approach must change.
Nigeria should stop treating defence procurement as an end in itself. Procurement should be a tool for industrialisation.
There is a legitimate argument for acquiring sophisticated technologies that Nigeria does not yet possess. Advanced air defence systems, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, aerospace technologies and other specialised capabilities may require cooperation with countries possessing more mature defence industries.
But the same argument cannot reasonably be applied to every category of military equipment.
Nigeria already has manufacturers capable of producing various basic defence items, components, accessories and consumables. Yet local manufacturers continue to face the paradox of having production capacity without adequate and predictable domestic patronage.
This is unsustainable.
Why should Nigerian companies invest in factories, machinery, engineers and research when they cannot be assured that government will buy products they are capable of producing to the required standards?
And why should Nigeria continue exporting scarce foreign exchange to purchase products that can be made domestically?
The answer cannot simply be that imported products are available or that foreign suppliers have established relationships with procurement authorities. National defence procurement must ultimately serve national industrial interests.
This does not mean lowering standards or forcing the Armed Forces to purchase inferior equipment because it is locally manufactured. National security cannot be compromised.
But where Nigerian manufacturers can meet the required specifications, they should be deliberately integrated into the defence procurement system.
Where they cannot meet the specifications, government should ask what is required to help them develop that capacity.
And where the technology is beyond Nigeria’s present capability, that is where strategic international partnerships should come in.
This should be the philosophy guiding the Turkish partnership.
Türkiye should not merely become another source from which Nigeria buys weapons. It should become a strategic partner in helping Nigeria learn how to develop and produce more of its own defence requirements.
That distinction is critical.
Any major defence-industrial agreement with Türkiye should therefore be subjected to clear performance benchmarks. How much technology will be transferred? How many Nigerians will be trained? What percentage of production will occur locally? What intellectual property will Nigeria acquire? What components will eventually be manufactured domestically? What research and development facilities will be established? What is the timetable for moving from complete importation to local assembly and ultimately indigenous production?
These questions should not be left to vague promises.
Memoranda of Understanding are easy to sign. Factories, skilled personnel, indigenous technologies and sustainable production capabilities are much harder to build.
Nigeria has signed enough agreements.
It now needs results.
There is also an urgent need for a national defence industrial consumption and capability database. Without reliable data, policymakers are effectively planning in the dark.
The database should capture defence equipment consumption, procurement history, replacement cycles, maintenance requirements, projected demand and the existing production capabilities of Nigerian companies.
It should also identify precisely where Nigeria lacks capacity and where foreign technology is required.
Such a database would serve another important purpose: it would give potential investors the confidence that there is a predictable domestic market.
No serious investor will commit substantial capital to manufacturing without a reasonable understanding of future demand.
The government cannot simultaneously complain about Nigeria’s dependence on imported defence equipment and fail to provide the predictable offtake necessary to sustain local production.
There must be a deliberate procurement policy that gives credible Nigerian manufacturers access to a defined portion of government demand, subject, of course, to quality, price, reliability and operational requirements.
The country must also embrace standardisation.
Where operationally feasible, the Armed Forces should reduce unnecessary duplication of equipment platforms, components and systems. Fragmented procurement creates expensive logistical chains, increases maintenance costs and makes the supply of spare parts more difficult.
A more harmonised equipment architecture would not only save money; it could create larger and more predictable markets for Nigerian manufacturers.
The broader economic benefits could be enormous.
A serious defence industry can stimulate advanced manufacturing, engineering, electronics, telecommunications, aerospace, artificial intelligence, robotics, metallurgy and other high-value sectors.
It can create skilled employment and develop technologies that eventually find applications outside the military.
But this requires policy consistency.
Government cannot change procurement priorities arbitrarily, neglect local manufacturers for years and then expect investors to develop globally competitive defence industries.
Defence industrialisation is a long-term project. It requires patient capital, research and development, technical education, stable procurement policies, strong quality-control institutions and effective collaboration between the Armed Forces, government agencies, universities, research institutions and private industry.
Above all, it requires political will.
The proposed Turkish partnership should therefore be viewed as an opportunity to reset Nigeria’s approach to defence cooperation.
We should not ask only: What weapons can Türkiye sell to Nigeria?
We should ask: What capabilities can Türkiye help Nigeria build?
That is the question that matters.
Nigeria will continue to need foreign defence technology for the foreseeable future. There is nothing inherently wrong with that. No country produces every component of its military arsenal domestically.
But strategic autonomy requires the ability to produce, maintain, repair, upgrade and sustain a significant portion of one’s critical defence capabilities.
Nigeria must therefore move from a procurement culture to a capability culture.
The objective should be clear: buy what we cannot produce, produce what we can, and use international partnerships to acquire the technology required to produce what we currently cannot.
Anything less risks perpetuating the cycle that has kept Nigeria dependent on foreign suppliers for decades.
The country does not need another defence partnership merely because another country is willing to offer one.
It needs partnerships that deliver measurable national capability.
If the proposed collaboration with Türkiye can provide technology, expertise, investment, training and industrial capacity that strengthens Nigerian manufacturers and reduces long-term dependence on imports, then it deserves strong support.
But if it becomes primarily another avenue for importing equipment without building sustainable domestic capacity, Nigeria will have missed another opportunity.
The ultimate measure of a successful defence partnership should not be how much equipment Nigeria receives. It should be how much capability Nigeria retains after the equipment arrives.
Nigeria must stop buying its way to self-reliance. It must begin building its way there.
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